NEW -YORK STATE
MEDICAL PATIENTS

"D OUBLE-- EOPARDY" OF

"'Aphysician shall be dedicated to providing competent
medical care, with compassion and respect for human
dignity and rights."'This is the number one principle
of medical ethics adopted by the American Medical
Association (AMA)., which vicariously applies to all
of its practicing professional members-physicians. In
essence, the phy sician's sole responsibility isto preserve
human life to the best of his or her abilities. In the past
decade, this is where some New York physicians have
fallen short of complying with these ethical standards.
As a result of the irresponsibility of a few physicians
practicing within the State of New York, the New York
State Insurance Department and the Medical Society
of the State of New York (MSSNY) claim that New
York is submerged in a medical malpractice "crisis."
On July 2, 2007, State Insurance Superintendent Eric
R. Dinallo for the State of New York announced that
the Insurance Department was implementing a 14%
increase to medical malpractice insurance premium
rates.3 As aresult, then Governor Eliot Spitzer directed
Insurance Department Superintendent Dinallo to
torm a task force consisting of medical, insurance,
and legal experts to investigate the reasons behind
high medical malpractice costs. TIhis article will
explore the legislative bills that were introduced by
legislators of the New York State Senate and Assembly
in response to the "crisis," as well as their impact on
the civil justice system and on the supposed "crisis."
In addition, the analysis will compare New York's
proposed bills to the implementation of malpractice
tort reforms in other states and their effectiveness in
their respective foruns.
First, this article gives an overview of what is entailed
in a medical malpractice action in New York, as
well as give a synopsis of previous medical liability
reform in New York and the current statutes relevant
to medical malpractice. Second, this article analyzes
the proposed legislation that has been introduced
in the New York State Assembly and Senate, which
will affect a patient's right to bring an action for
malpractice, and xwill alter the litigation of such claims.

Third, this article focuses on responding to the claims
of organizations such as MSSNY about the adverse
affect that medical malpractice litigation has had on
the practice of medicine in the State of New York.
Finally, this article summarizes the points previously
addressed.

L. Background
Due to the complexity and uniqueness of medical
malpractice law in New York, it is essential to discuss
the procedural process of a medical malpractice action
in the state judiciary system, and to put into context the
effect of tort reform on the process.

A. Cause of Action for Medical Malpractice
in New York
As in any tort action for damages, a lawsuit for medical
malpractice first begins with an alleged injured person
who obtains counsel to file a claim against one or
more tortfeasors. In New York. a plaintiff's complaint
must have a Certificate of Merit declaring that the
attorney for the plaintiff, after reviewing the facts
and consulting with a physician who is licensed in
the state and is knowledgeable of the relevant issues,
has concluded that there is a "reasonable basis for the
commencement of such action." 5The attorney does
not need to disclose the identity of the consulting
physician.6 jThe justification for such a requirement is
to serve as evidence in the event of an action against
the plaintiff for filing a frivolous lawsuit.
T'he plaintiff bears the burden of presenting and
proving a prima facie case of liability in such actions
by proving: "(I) the standard of care in the locality
where the treatment occurred., (2) that the defendant
breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach
of the standard of care was the proximate cause of
the imjun." The locality standard of care has been
upheld in New York case law for nearly a hundred
years, from its inception in Pike v. Honsinger, xwhere
the court ruled that a doctor should exercise the same
reasonable degree of care practiced by phy sicians and
surgeons in the locality wxhere that doctor practices.
In otler words, the plaintiff must proxve that the
defendant phy sician v iolated the standard of care in
the geographic aiea of the practice, or in the specialty
of the piactice. As a iesult of the conmplexitx revolving
around prosving this standard of care, courts require
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expert testimony at trial in order to clarify issues of
professional or technical knowledge which is beyond
the knowledge of the jury."' Expert testimony is vital
to the resolution of medical malpractice actions, and
a plaintiff cannot prove its case without presenting
such evidence, except in the rare instance where the
issues are within the jury's competence to evaluate.
Furthermore, after discussing facts and information
relied upon in their analysis, medical experts must
conclude within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that the defendant did or did not commit
malpractice which was or was not a substantial factor
in causing the plaintiff's injury."
In terms of discovery, CPLR § 3101 is the governing
statute for disclosure of documents, information,
witnesses and experts. In malpractice actions, parties
are not required to disclose the name of their medical
expert witness. Ilowever, they must disclose all
other intormation, including a summary of the basis
for their opinions., the facts and data that they relied
upon, and their qualificationsi? The thought behind
such an exception is that the disclosure of the identity
of medical experts may subject them to pressure
and intimidation by their colleagues not to testif,
since the expert is required to be from the same or
similar locality as the defendant physician. Another
possible purpose is to promote settlement, because
the attorneys may not want to risk facing damaging
expert testimony at trial. Notably, CPLR §§3101(d)(i)
and (ii) are currently under consideration by the State
Legislature to be amended.
With respect to presenting expert testimony at trial,
there are instances where such testimony can be
challenged by the opposing party through a Frye
hearing.13 At a Frye hearing, which occurs during pretrial motions in limine, the party offering the expert
testimony has the burden of proving that the science and
opinions relied upon by its expert is "generally accepted'
by the relevant scientific community.14 The proponent
must prove three essential criteria.: (1) the techniques
generate results generalls accepted as reliable wvithin
the scientific community; (2) the techniques satisfy a
foundation inquiry on the evidenee; and (3) the rate
of error does not affect its trustxworthiness. and is for
the jury to decide. " In essence, the court lets the jury
decide on the soundness of the ev idence after it rules
that the science passes the standards of F;ye. IHossesver,
in medical malpractice cases, courts hasve begun to

the provisions in CPLR § 3 101(d), it is difficult for an
opposing party to challenge the opinions of an expert
who has not given oral testimony prior to trial because
a party is free to reject a request to have the expert
deposed. See, CPLR § 3101(d)(ii).'
In medical malpractice actions, plaintiffs can recover
economic damages (past and future medical expenses.,
loss of earnings and reduced earning capacity), and
non-economic damages (pain and suffering, mental
anguish, loss of consortium). "A plaintiff can also
recover damages from a hospital where the physician
responsible for the injury is an independent contractor
if the hospital maintained control over the manner
and means of the physician's work and the plaintiff
reasonably believed that the treating physician was
acting on its behalf.
Complexity arises when multiple defendants are
involved, which is quite common inmedicalmalpractice
cases. Issues arise as to a defendant's joint and several
liability for a damage award in favor of the plaintiff.
If there are multiple defendants, then the percentage
of their respective culpabilities (or liabilities) dictates
their responsibility for non-economic damages, unless
a defendant is more than 50% liable, in which case that
defendant is responsible for all of the non-economic
damages. 0 In either case, the plaintiff can sue any
of the liable defendants for the full amount of the
economic damages. For example, assume that there
are three defendants: A, B, and C, and their respective
liabilities are 50%, 30%, and 20%. If non-economic
damages are $100,000, then A pays $50,000, B pays
$30,000 and C pays $20,000. But ifA xwas 51% liable,
then the plaintiff could go after A for the full $ 100,000
of non-economic damages. In addition, the plaintiff
could seek the economic damages from any of the
three defendants - usually the one with the deepest
pocket. The problem arises when there is a non-party
tortfeasor, who plaintiff could have but failed to sue.
In that instance, the delendants who are parties to
the action are allowed to decrease their percentage
of liability by the percentage of eulpability of the
non-party tortfeasor." The status of joint and several
liability is further discussed beloss regarding the
proposed leislation. Currently, some of the statutes
that are under consideration for amendment include
CP1LR §§3012-a, 3101(d)(i), 3101(d)(ii), and 1600-03.

B.last Medical Malpractice Reform in the

rely less on the use olfrye beearings becatuse of the

belief that the jurors should be allowsed to xseigh the
credibility ot expert medical opinions. Courts fear that
strict application of Frye hearings will deter people
from suing.16 Furthermore,. if one takes into account
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In order to understand the current situation of medical
malpractice law in New York, it is necessary to discuss
past actions taken by the legislature in times of claimed
"crisis," and the effect of such lassws over time.

In 1974, the state enacted its first medical malpractice
reform act in response to a perceived crisis due to the
state's largest medical malpractice insurer withdrawing
from the Nxew York market. Between 1974 and 1985.
legislation for reform came about in piecemeal fashion,
and was not effective. Such shortcomings included
the lack of appropriate goveming bodies to conduct
and control a system of medical peer reviews, and a
disciplinary network.24
One of the largest failures from the 1970's reforms was
the creation of medical malpractice panels, which had
the purpose of reducing congested court calendars and
fostering settlement." In 1980, the Ad Hoc Committee
on Medical Malpractice Panels concluded, after an
exhaustive study, that there was no real connection
between panel findings and subsequent settlements.26
On JuI 2, 1985, then Governor Mario Cuomo signed
into law a medical malpractice reform bill (the "Reform
Act"), which had three principle objectives: (1) curtail
the cost of malpractice insurance; (2) quicken the
litigation of malpractice claims; and (3) reduce the
incidence of medical malpractice." Ihe Reform
Act increased hospitals' existing statutory duty to
regulate the quality ot medical care by implementing
and installing a medical malpractice identification
and prevention programo.28 OWever, the Reform Act
oddly stops short of setting forth sanctions in the event
of a hospital's failure to conduct such reviews or to
implement the prevention program.
In terms of disclosing evidence during discovery,
Section 4 of the Reform Act broadened disclosure by.,
among other things, requiring a party, upon request,
to disclose "the substance of the facts and opinions
on which each expert is expected to testifY, the
qualifications of each expert witness and a summary
of the grounds for each expert's opinion."9 This
turned into CPLR § 3101(d), which also includes the
medical expert identity exception discussed above.
The exception seems counterintuitive to the general

purpose of Section 4 of the Reform Act, which was to

Judiciary Law §474-a, a plaintiff 's attorney receives
30% of the first $250,000; 25% of the next $250,000;
20% of the next $500,000; 15% of the next ,$50,000;
and 10% of any amount over $1,250,000.
The
rationale behind this law was that a plaintiff's attorney
would lose incentive to try to go after higher damage
awards because of their decreasing fee percentage.
In further attempts to reduce judgments against
defendants, the Reform Act introduced the Collateral
Source Rule. which allows defendants to enter into
evidence plaintiff's receipt of compensation or benefit
from a collateral source. 33 In order for the courts to
implement this properly, juries must itemize the
damages into past and future damages. 34 In addition,
the Reform Act provided for the periodic payment of
future damages rather than lump-sun payments for
txxwo
reasons: it is arguably cheaper to make periodic
payments, and it prevents alleged "windfall" awards to
relatives if the plaintift passes away before the period
for which a particular award was intended to provide
compensation expires .3 There is the argument that
such payments are unconstitutional and deprive the
parties of their right to choose freely the use of the
awards.'0
In examining the Reform Act of 1985, the legislature
appeared to be ready to implement new reforms
and laws concerning medical malpractice litigation;
however, at the same time there is a sense of hesitation
of not going too far. For instance, the Reform Act
failed to set forth sanctions for those hospitals that
did not comply with Public Health Law § 2803. In
addition, the courts intervened in a few instances,
such as by imposing sanctions for frivolous lawsuits
and medical malpractice panels, in order to preserve
the strong public policy of open and unimpeded access
to the courts. As discussed below, some provisions of
the Reflorm Act of 1985 have lost their initial purpose.,
such as the non-disclosure of the medical expert's
identity to prevent intimidation of potential testifying
medical experts.

quicken litigation of malpractice claims by broadening
disclosure, and thus facilitate settlement.
The Reform Act also attacked 'frixvolous' laxwsuits
through section 10, xwhich imposes sanctions for bad
faith filing of claims, defenses, cross-claims, and
counter-claims.3 H OWxcx er the courts haxve been
xxary to impose these sanctions under the belief that
such penaulties w old severely ihit tle state's
stiong public policy of open access to the courts.~
The Reform Act tackled this issue in another way: by
creating a downward sliding scale for contingency
fees for plaintiffs' attorneys. According to New York

Throughout 2007. the Nesw York State Legislatture xxas
buss submsitting and debating various bills conceining
medical malpractice reforns in5 order to respoisd to
the supposed "crisis" in Nexx York. The bills do not
focus only on certain aspects of the litigation process
but, instead, address the wxhole process frons start to
finish. The proposed legislation that is at the focal
point of the curreist reforns moxvemneist is Bill No.'
A03139, which Assemblyman Robin Schmminger
introduced on January 23, 2007.3 7This bill is entitled
the "Medical Liability Reform Act," because it repeals
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and amends several provisions in the Reform Act of
1985. Other bills target the collateral source coverage
for physicians, as well as improve the oversight by the
Department of Health Office of Professional Medical
Conduct (OPMC).

A. Bringing a Cause of Action -

Statute

of Limitations, Certificate of Merit, and
Court of Claims Jurisdiction
Unlike other civil tort actions, medical malpractice
cases are governed by separate procedural statutes
regarding the period of limitations to commence a
lawsuit and the prerequisites to filing a complaint.
Jurisdictional issues for Court of Claims actions in
New York are also unique to malpractice suits.

i. CPLR § 214-a: Statute of Limitations for
a Medical Malpractice Action
Medical malpractice actions have a special statute
of limitations provision under CPLR § 214-a, which
was one of the provisions brought about by the
Reform Act of 1985. The statute states that an action
for medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice must be
commenced within tso years and six months from the
act or omission that caused the injury.38 In the case of a
foreign object in the body, the statute runs either for a
year from when the object is discovered or trom when
facts arise that would lead to discovery ot the obect.39
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions is rather restrictive and can lead to harsh results
because it does not take into account those plaintiffs
who are not in a position to perceive the connection
between the injury and possible medical error within
the prescribed period. The statute relies solely upon
when the act or omission that is the cause of the injury
occurred, and not when the plaintiff should have
reasonably known of it.I he issue here, then, becomes
the lack of transparency in the medical profession,
which inhibits a plaintil 's ability to bring an action
because the physician rarely communicates to the
patient that a medical error occurred.(40 One reason
patients file lawNsuits is beause they are not prosvided
sufflict information from the health care sy stcm and
do not knoN if their injuries arc due to malpractice:
thcy may fle lawNsuits to find out the cause.4
HlarNvey F inkelstein, M.D. is a pain management
phy sician in Long Island, NewN York Nwho reused
syringe needles, thus putting Inearly 628 patients at risk
for contracting HIV and/or hcpatitis4 Dr. Finketein
did not disclose this practice and, the Department
of Health, Nwhich insvestigatcd thcse incidents, did
not direct Dr. Finkelstein to disclose this egregious
conduct and the risk of infection to his patients until
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some three years after the fact.4 3 Since the statute of
limitations is 30 months., if any patient were infected,
they would be barred from filing a lawsuit by CPLR
§ 214-a. The patients had no way of knowing what
caused their illness. if they became infected, because
the health system failed to provide them with the
necessary information in a timely fashion.
ouing v. ew York City Health & Hospitals Corp
exemplifies the harshness of the statute of limitations
doctrine.44 In Young, a female patient brought suit
against her treating physicians and clinic for failure
to diagnose breast cancer. The patient alleged that, in
April 1990, she underwent a mammogram at the clinic
which indicated a nodular densits in the left breast;
this result warranted a biopsy to rule out malignancy
lowever, these results were not communicated to the
patient at that time. She received treatment at the clinic
in June and September 1990 for unrelated conditions
but was not told of the mammogram results. The
patient first became aware of the results in November
190 and underwent another mammogram in January
1991 that confirmed the diagnosis of cancer. She
undeivent a mastectomy and received postoperative
care from the defendants until July 1991. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decision to
grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
claim as time barred regarding any acts or omissions
amounting to medical malpractice which occurred
prior to the accrual of the cause of action in November
1990.45 The Court concluded that a course of treatment
for the same condition which gave rise to the cause
of action did not exist between April and November
1990.46 Furthermore,. the Court ruled that the patient
failed to show that further treatment for breast cancer
was contemplated by both parties in April 1990.47
On March 7, 2007, New York Assembly members
Peter Grannis and Hlelene \Weinstein proposed a bill to
amend CPLR § 214-a. Ihe bill states that an action
for medical malpractice must be commenced within
two years and six months of the "accrual of any such
action." 48 The bill defines the accrual esvent as swhen
"one knosss or should hayve knossn of the alleged
ncgligcnt act or omission and knosss or should hasve
knossn that said neoligent act has caused an injury."4
The bill ssould relax the harslh effects ol the statute
of limitations because the statute wsould not begin to
run until information and facts are made asailable for
the patient to realize that theii injury may base been
c~aused by meical hmaltractice. Ti s more eqoitable
statute ot limitations ssould, in ettect, combat the
rampant lack of communication between physicians,
such as Dr. Finkelstein, and their patients concerning
injuries from medical errors.

In addition, the proposed amendment to C'PLR § 214-a
of the physician is disclosed, and an affidavit must
would. help support the courts"' public policy or open
address each cause of action where there are multiple
and uninhibited access to the judicial system. Under the defendants." As such, more than one physician affidavit
original statute, the physician holds all the information must be submitted.
that the patient needs in order to realize what occurred..
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a complaint for a medical
sxystem. It inhibits the plaintiff's access to the courts and
malpractice action, a plaintiff's attorneys must attach
a Certificate of Merit to the complaint, as required by places enormous burdens, including financial, in order
to commence an action.
CPLR § 3012-a. I-Aiderthe statute, a plaintiff s attornevs
must declare that they have concluded that there is a
reasonable basis for the lawsuit based upon their review
of the facts,, and their consultation with a physician who
practices in -the State of New York. and is knowledgeable
ofthe relevant. issues.") 'Fhe statute's main purpose is
to prevent plaintiffs from filing frivolous law-suits."
There are no sanctions for failure to comply with the
statutory requirement', but case law indicates that courts
will grant an extension of tirne to file the Certificate with
the court.552 The plaintiff is not required to disclose the
identity of the, consulting physician, except in the case
where the plaintiff consulted with three physiciatis who
failed to provide the inforn-iation required to certify the

iii. New York Constitution, Article VI,§9;
Court of Clairns Act §8
In New York whenever there is an action against the
State, the action must be brought in the Court of Claims
and not in any of the Supreme Courts. In the Court of
Claims,. only a bench trial is permitted., with no trial by
jury." The State cannot be sued in any of the Supreme
Courts of New York.' An action cannot be brought
against a state employee in the Court of Claims unless
their alleged negligence occurred during their official
capacity as an Officer of the State.61 A state agent or
officer can be sued in the New York Supreme Court
for tort danmages because of a breached duty oxxed
indiv idually by them to tlhe plaintiff; the State can he
held secondarily liable tuider iespondeat supeior.6 "
In Mforell,6 3 the Court of Appeals rejected a narroxx
interpretation of dhe Court of Clainms Act that xxould bar
actions against State agents in Supreme Court.64 1The
imnmunity ot the State does not pass through to State

which concludes that "there is a reasonable basis for the
commencement of an action."54 In addition, the identity

eniploy ees iin such aetioins merely because they are
employed bx the State.' 6Th us,the separation betwveen
the State and its eniploy ees in tort actions helps to
preserxve the injured party's constitutional right to trial
by jury. In such a case. the injured party could have an
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action against the physicians in the Supreme Court while also commencing
an action against the State in the Court of Claims on the same matter. In
a practical sense, the plaintiff's attorney would want to resolve the action
against the physicians first - either by settlement or a jury verdict in their
favor. One possible tactic would be to receive a favorable jury verdict in
Supreme Court, and then attempt to use that evidence against the State in
the Court of Claims to show the physician's percentage of culpability while
alleging the doctrine of respondeat superior against the State. 66 Court of
Claims judges would not likely look favorably on such an attempt since the
State was not a party to the Supreme Court action.
The issue of distribution of liability amongst the defendants exists in the
Supreme Court action. Defendants might allege that the State's liability
should be factored into the judgment in order to lower the culpability
percentages of the physicians. Plaintiffs cannot overcome this by proffering
to the court that they are unable to obtain jurisdiction over the State in that
Supreme Court. It is not an inability to obtain jurisdiction, but rather a result
of a rule of substantive law based on sovereign immunity.,6
On January 3, 2007, an Assembly bill was introduced to amend the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. The bill amends the New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation (NYCHHC) Act Ch. 1016(1)(20) by
extending the Court of Claims' jurisdiction to the NYCIH C, its officers
and employees for actions that arise during their employment with the
NY CHIIC.68 1The first problem with this proposed amendment is that it
would unconstitutionally deny the injured party his or her due process right
to a trial by jury.69 IThe statute forces injured parties to bring their actions
against state and city emploxed physicians into the Court of Claims, which
does not offer jury trials. The second more subtle problem is that patients of
state and city run hospitals and clinics are usually of middle or lower income.
As these patients do not have the resources to go to private physicians or
hospitals of their choosing, they lose their constitutional right to ajury trial
if they are injured by a physician at a state- or city-run medical facility.
B. CPLR 3101(d): Medical Expert Disclosure
The Reform Act of 1985 fostered CPLR 3101(d), with the purpose of
facilitating settlement by broadening disclosure and speeding up litigation.
The courts struggled with the medical expert exception in subsection (ii) of
the statute, which allows parties to exclude the identity of their medical
experts, but requires the disclosure of their qualifications and summaries
of their opinions, and the facts and data upon which they will testify.n
In Jasopersaudv. Rho,72 the court grappled with the idea of whether the
proponent had a substantixe right to xxithhold the identity of the expert.
WXhile discussing this issue, the court dexveloped a 'balancing test' betxxeen
bioad disclosure and the risk that disclosed intormation xxould lead to
the expert's identity.7 In 202 the Second Depaitment stated that it xxas
futile to try to conceal the identity ot a medical expeit due to the wxealth of
resources, espccially the internet. xvhich can identifx the expcrt through
the information disclosed. 74 Nonetheless, thc court iuled that thc proponent
could seek a protective order under CPLR 3103(a) to prexvent disclosure
ot the cxpert's qualifications xxhich xxould lead to the disclosure ot their
idcntity .' Othcr than thc cxception being xxeakened by modern technolooy,
the probability that the expert will be effectively pressured not to testify if
the identity is disclosed is offset by the relaxation of the locality standard of
care since the Reform Act of 1985. 6
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In the bill submitted by Assemblymember Robin Schimminger, the
provisions pertaining to medical malpractice actions in CPILR 3101(d)
would be amended. The amended provisions discard the medical expert
exception in subsection (i) that protects the identity of the medical expert,
and require, under subsection (ii), that the parties conduct oral depositions
of medical experts at the expense of the requesting party?
In practical terms, the medical expert exception no longer served its
purpose, since it is now very dilticult to conceal the identity of the
expert while disclosing the expert's qualifications and other information.
However, abandoning this exception means that the plaintiff no longer has
the statutory or substantive right to seek a protective order under CPLR
3103(a). The exception still did serve a purpose in preserving the plaintiff's
right to seek such a protective order.
The purpose of the proposed broader disclosure is to take CPL R 3101(d)
a step further than the Reform Act of 1985 and try to achieve its goal of
expediting litigation and facilitating settlement negotiations. Once again,
this amendment places a harsh burden on the plaintiff. In practice, an oral
deposition of an expert is very costly because experts are paid for their
time. In addition, during discovery and pre-trial preparation, parties will
identify numerous experts to finalize and strengthen their theory of the case
before finally settling on one or more experts for trial. During discovery, a
plaintiff will not know which of the defendant's experts will testify at trial
and therefore is forced to choose which experts to depose. Depositions are
very costly to a plaintiff and to the attorneys working on a contingency
fee basis, they may hesitate to depose numerous experts. If the plaintiff
chooses to depose only some of the defendant's experts, then the defendant
can opt to bring one of the non-deposed experts to testify at trial.
IThe amended provision also is counterproductive to the grand scheme of
the bill, which is to lower costs to malpractice insurers and physicians.
Litigation will also be expensive for the defendants if they choose to depose
their co-defendant's experts and/or the plaintiff's experts. That very well
may be the point of the amended statute - to get both sides to avoid high
litigation costs by resolving the matter early on in the litigation process. At
the same time, the provision acts as an inhibitor for the plaintiff to reach
a jury trial because the plaintiff or the attorney cannot afford the high
litigation costs associated with deposing experts.
C. CPLR 1601: Joint and Several Liability
One of the compromises in the Reform Act of 1985 is Article 16 of the
CPLR, the joint and sceral liabilitx provisions. Specifically, CPLR 1601
affects the liabilitx of defcndants for non-economic damages. in that each
defendant is liable for the percentage of non-economic damages in relation
to their sharc of culpability. For cconomic damages, the plaintiff can
rccoxver 100%o of thc economic damages from any defendant found liablc."
In addition, if a defendant's culpability cxcccds 50%o, then the plaintiff can
recoxer 10% of the non-economic damages from that defendant.80 [or
economic damages, the plaintiff usually seeks the deepest pocket, such as a
hospital rather than a phy sician. Articlec 16 modified the common lawx rule of

joint and sexveral

liability, based on the premise that the full compensation ot
a relatixvely innocent xictim is moue important than a balancing of fault.~
Schimmingers proposed bill amends CPLR § 1601 by removing the
clause referring to a defendant who is more than 50% culpable who then

could be held responsible for 100% of all non-economic
damages." The bill also states that a defendant is liable
to the plaintiff for non-economic and economic damages
not exceeding that defendant's share of liability.>
Defendants would only be at risk for paying that portion
of the economic damages commensurate with their
percentage of fault. Under the bill, the defendant's
share of the culpability dictates the percentage of both
economic and non-economic damages that that defendant
is liable to the plaintiff.
This amendment to CPLR § 1601 undermines the
common law purpose of joint and several liability,
which is to compensate plaintiffs fully and allow them to
recover from the deep pocket (i.e., the hospital instead of
the physician) in actions for medical malpractice. Under
the current statute, in an action where the plaintiff sued
and received a favorable judgment against a hospital and
phy sician, the plaintiff would usually try to recover the
economic damages from the deeper pocket, the hospital.
If the plaintilt tries to recover all the economic damages
trom the physician, the plaintiff runs the risk that the
physician would not have sufficient insurance coverage
or enough assets to fully compensate the plaintiff. By
recovering all economic damages from the hospital. the
plaintiff has a better chance of full compensation. The
burden is on the 'deep pocket' to indemnify itself against
the physician.
The amendment of CPLR § 1601 flips the burden and
forces the plaintiff to deal with recovering economic
damages from all the defendants. Thus, the plaintiff
might not receive full compensation because a defendant
may not have sufficient coverage or assets to cover its
percentage of damages. In essence, the amendment
protects the hospitals over the injured party.

D. Article 50-C: Limitation on
Non-Economic Damages
Putting a cap on non-economic damages is very
controversial in medical malpractice tort reform
actions. The majority of states that enacted some forn
of malpractice reform include statutes capping noneconomic damage axxards. IThe theory behind such a
cap is that reducing the amount ot judgments in medical
malpiactice claims xwill reduce malpractice premiums
tor physicians.84
Schiimminger's proposed bill includes the enactment of
a nexx article to the CP1R, Article 50-C, xxhich places a
cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages, regardless
of hoxx many defendants are in the action.i Caps on
damages do not reduce malpractice insurance premiums,
and only hurt the severely injured plaintils. Other states
that have imposed caps on non-economic damages did
not experience a correlation between reduced judgments

and reduced premiums. In 2002, Nevada passed caps
on damages and within days, its two largest insurance
companies announced that they had no intention of
lowering their rates." When Mississippi considered
damages caps in the summer of 2002., physicians
were told by their insurers that they would face a 45%
increase in premium rates regardless of whether the
state implemented damage caps." The Nations' largest
medical malpractice insurer, GE Medical Protective,
tried to raise premiums by 19%, claiming that noneconomic damage caps are nominal and will only create
loss savings of one percent. This occurred six months
after Texas passed its caps on non-economic damages."
Lastly, the 2003 Farmers Insurance Group demonstrated
that caps do not result in affordable insurance for
physicians - the Group pulled out of five states.
including California, xwhich has had caps and tort reform
for decades.
Insurance companies respond to the state of the
economy and the cyclical effects of the industry's
investment market. 0 A study explicitly concluded that
between 1991 and 2002, the states with caps on noneconomic damages saw median physician premiums rise
48%, while in states without caps, physicians' median
premiums rose only 36 %.1 Experiences in other states
and studies done on the connection between premium
rates and damages caps demonstrate that there is in fact
no correlation. Some would argue that it would make
more sense for the statutes imposing caps on damages
to include a provision that reduces premiums as well
- an option that New York has not considered. Tort
reform supporters point to the fact that in Califomia,
where there are caps on non-economic damages of
$250,000 (not adjusted for inflation), malpractice
insurance premiums stabilized and declined." However,
the decline in malpractice insurance premiums was not
due to the damages caps but, rather, because California
passed Proposition 103 in 1988, which required insurers
to open their books to justify their rate increases.
The real downside to imposing damage caps, especially
on non-economic axxaids. is that the greatest negatixve
effects from such caps arc those plaintiffs xxho suffer
severe injuries xxithout substantial economic loss>94
essence, plaintiffs wxould be facine "double-jeopardy,"
tirst hurt by the health care proxvider, and then penalized
by the laxw. lIn addition, damage caps ixullify claims for
decrease in quality of life. Disfigurement, deafness,
blindness, and other injuries may have minimal economic
lhave large noni-economic damuagcs because
of the peison's reduced quality and enjoyment of life.~
damacges, but

WN
omen are especially adversely affected by noneconomic damage caps. Women who bring gytnecological
malpractice suits can lose their axards because their
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injuries, which include impaired fertility, impaired sexual functioning,
miscarriage and scarring, do not carry large economic losses, even though
they account for serious emotional suffering, lost sense of self. and reduced
quality and enjoyment of life." These women would be deprived of their
legal rights to bring such lawsuits because the role of the jury is abrogated by
the damage caps in actions for gynecological malpractice. Thus, the injured
women are not fully compensated for their injuries. Instead, Californian
women are subject to an arbitrary flat cap on damages that is not adjusted
for inflation. Ifthe cap were adjusted for inflation, the cap level would have
been set at $779,000 in 1999.7
Non-economic damage caps do not affect insurance premium rates or
healthcare costs in general, because premiums account for less than txxwo
percent of total health costs." In the end, the caps deprive plaintiffs of their
legal rights to having a jury determine the full extent of their damages,
while plaintiffs laxxyers operating on contingent fees likely will decide not
to pursue non-economic damage-oriented claims.

E. Medical Malpractice Insurance Reform
When the New York State Insurance Department announced that it
approved an increase of 14% in medical malpractice insurance rates,
the Department cited the misappropriation of funds as one of the chief
causes of this "crisis."
Specifically, the State previously appropriated
$691 million of the medical malpractice insurance reserve funds from
the Medical Malpractice Insurance Association (MMIA) to meet other
budgetary needs. 100 Ihe MMIA fund was created to provide insurance for
those physicians who could not get regular commercial coverage because
of their high risk status. TIhe Insurance Department admits that if "MMIA's
reserves [had]I been preserved and allowed to grow by collecting interest
over the years ... medical malpractice insurers would be in a much stronger
financial position today."101 The Medical Malpractice Insurance Plan
(MMIP) replaced the MMIA but, according to the Insurance Department,
it has a deficit of $525 million, which by law must be shouldered by the
malpractice insurers in the State.102
In January 2007, State Senator Liz Krueger proposed a bill to amend
§ 6524(11) of the Education Law to require that every practicing physician
in the State of New York procure a policy of at least one million U.S.
dollars."o" In that same month, another bill was proposed which would
establish a separate state fund to compensate neurologically impaired
infants as a result of the acts or omissions of obstetricians-gynecologists
(013/GYN) and midwives.104 1'o months later, another insurance bill was
proposed xxhich xxould proxvide excess insurance to plhysic inns wxho arc
unable to obtain commercial insurance because they are considered "highrisk." T~0Ihe
fourth proposed insuiance bill of 2007 dealt wxith requiring the
medical liability insuiance association to replace the insurance pool xxhich
the State (lrainedl of all of its fimdS.106
The MMlIP has a deficit of $525 millioni because it subsidized high-risk
phy siciains xxho could not obtain comnmercial iinsuraince. Sexven perccent
of phy sicians arc responsible for txxo-thirds of all medical malpractice
pay outs. 1ThIis small number of phy sicians is responsible for draining
the fund, thus forcing the insurers to coxver the losses. These phxysicians,
who are so high-risk they cannot even obtain commercial insurance, are
still allowed to continue their practice without disciplinary actions and are
guaranteed by the State to receive insurance.
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Bills S0973 and S7038 both
require practicing medical
professionals to obtain
insurance of one million
U.S. dollars. Ilowever, in
order to qualify for excess
insurance of one million
U.S. dollars from the
medical liability insurancc
fund, a physician must have
$1.3 million in insurance
coverage.10s Instead of
requiring these physicians
to obtain the extra $300,000,
the bill proposes further
subsidies for the physicians
by providing them with
the $300,000 from a stateoperated hospital fund
that is under the control of
the Superintendent of the
Insurance Department.u0
On top of providing
subsidized insurance to
high-risk physicians through the medical liability insurance plan, the State
further subsidizes all physicians from a hospital fund in order to qualify for
excess insurance. Bill S7038 does not differentiate between good and bad
doctors; nor does it differentiate between specialties. Instead the proposed
bill provides a subsidy across the board to all physicians.
Instead of disciplining high-risk physicians, the State is guaranteeing
insurance for these physicians under the Medical Liability Insurance
Association. A study shows that, if New York stopped physicians who
committed three malpractice acts or more from harming more patients,
malpractice cases would decline by one-third.110 Instead, the State is
subsidizing insurance for physicians like Dr. Finkelstein,"' while ethical

physicians, who are the overwhelming majority, bear
the burden of paying higher premiums.
The other shortcoming of the rise in medical
malpractice insurance premiums is that insurance
rates are not based on experience. Premium rates are
not adjusted individually to reflect the physician's
performance history, such as with auto insurance.
On the contrary, malpractice premiums are the same
across the board based on the specialty rather than the
performance of individual physicians. Thus, the large
percentage of medical errors caused by that seven
percent of New York physicians negatively affects all
physicians' access to affordable insurance, rather than

just themselves.
T-he neurologically impaired infant tund also is not
necessary based on statistics available on OB /GYB
malpractice actions. The purpose of the fund is to
protect OB/GYN physicians by capping their liability,
based on the presumption that these specialists will
leave and are leaving the State due to high health
insurance costs." In fact, New York ranks third in
the nation with 39 O/13GYNs per thousand, while
California - the national 'model' for reform ranks, 17th.11 Additionally, Florida and Virginia both
attempted to implement the same program; however,
it failed in both states. No other state has implemented
such a program.114 One reason for its failure is that the
program is funded by fixed assessments from doctors
and hospitals, so the administrators have a strong
resolve for solvency of these funds versus making
compensation available. "
There is no evidence that these types of lawsuit are
so rampant that they should be removed from the
courthouse and subject to the whims of a state fund.
In reality, neurologically impaired infants are part of a
group that does not comprise a major part of medical
malpractice costs. 116 Instead, under such a fund,
plaintiffs would be barred from receiving redress from
the courts, thus encroaching on their constitutional
rights. The proposed bill also bars the plaintiff from
seeking non-economic damages on behalf of the infant
wxho xwill undoubtedly suffer pain and suffering, mental
anguish, and reduced quality of life. 11 7 The only gioup
that has an option to entei 01 leaxe the fund is the 0B/
GYN, not the infant. In shoirt, the flund's main purpose
is to isolate and protect GB/GYVNs trom paxying out
malpractice axxards" to the detriment of the legal
rights of injured infants and their families. The injured
infant endures a 'double-jeopardy' through the health
care sy stem, both injured from medical errors and
deprived of their legal rights.

These funds and insurance pools are initially what
drove New York State and the insurance companies
into this "crisis." Controls need to be imposed in order
to prevent another misappropriation o funds, such
as what happened with the $691 million that was in
the insurance pool. Administrators for the subsidized
insurance coverage should conduct physician screening
to weed out those physicians who pose not only a risk
to the funds in the pool, but also a risk to patients.119
Due to the absence of experience rating - adjusting
rates based on how safe or not safe individuals conducts
themselves - in medical malpractice insurance,
medical professionals cannot control their premiums
by improving their quality of care. 1 20 Thus, there is
no incentive to avoid liability. The main dilema, and
error, is that good physicians suffer just because they
are in a certain specialty.

F. Malpractice Prevention and Medical
Peer Review
Attacking the root of medical ialpractice, such as
physician errors, neglect and carelessness through
oversight and prevention programs could curtail rising
medical malpractice costs and payouts. For instance,
anesthesiologists had the highest premium rates as
compared to most other specialists in the 1980s,
until anesthesiologists began implementing safer
practices.'
Similar safety initiatives have occurred as a response

to mounting litigation in a particular specialty or area
of medicine. In Connecticut, an investigative journalist
used records from a pending malpractice lawsuit to
uncover an epidemic of hospital-borne infections.' It
was not until the lawsuit commenced and bad publicity
ensued that the hospital adopted safety measures which
reduced infection rates from 22% to nearly zero.12 3The
Harvard Medical Practice Study shows that litigation
drives safety as the experience of being sued makes
physicians twice as likely to take the time to explain
risks and communicate with patients. 124
In Nexx Nork, a major problem is oxversight and
discipline by the OPMC. According to the National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), only 28%o of the
phy sicians xvho made ten or more pay outs werc
disciplined by the OPMvC. 12 5 Instances such as Dr.
[inkelstein's case arc conmmonplace. In a sense, it is a
breakdowvn of the health sy stem in Ncew York. because
hospitals fail to investigate their phy sicians, and the
OPMC fails to investigate indixviduals xwho haxve a
number of pay outs or wxho arc knowxn to be high risks.
In January 2007, a bill was proposed to amend Public
Health Laxx §230(12-a) by requiring the commissioner
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to inforn the OPMC immediately of a physician who is the subject of a
medical malpractice lawsuit.12 In February 2007, a bill was submitted in
the Assembly to amend Public Health Law§ 230 (9-b) by providing that
the OPMC conduct a thorough investigation into the conduct of a physician
when the office accrues three reports relating to separate incidents within a
five-year period., or five reports xxwithin any twxo-year period for more severe
penalties.127
The goal and purpose of these amended statutes is to compel the OPMC
to regulate the conduct of medical professionals within the State of New
York to curtail rising medical malpractice costs and prevent further harm
to patients. As of now, litigation is the catalyst for such safety measures.
When errors occur on a frequent basis, then lawsuits will mount and place
costs upon providers until a balance is met and it becomes less costly for
the provider to implement measures to improve quality. " The tort system
is the only means of gaining insight into serious misconduct that endangers
patients, especially since the New York Patient Occurrence Reporting and
ITracking System (NYPORT1 S) denies access to injured patients who wish
to see data and peer reviewed records.129
These proposed laws existed in the guidelines for the OPMC; however,
they did not live up to their standard of review and oversight. 1o The
agency failed to investigate doctors with payrments for malpractice that
would usually trigger an investigation.i31i In addition, there was a chronic
recurrence of inexcusable errors, including surgery on the wrong limb and
leaving foreign bodies in the patients. TFhese acts amounted to at least 550
deaths per year in New York.2 IThe fact that these inexcusable errors occur
on such a frequent basis is an indication of poor patient safety and OPMC
laxity in its oversight of negligent and unethical doctors.
Public Citizen reported on the recommendation that the State's licensing
board investigate those physicians who are unable to obtain commercial
insurance coverage to see if they are suited to continue practicing
medicine." '3Elimination of such 'bad' doctors will protect the safety of
patients and will remove their adverse affects on insurance funds due to
multiple malpractice payouts.
Reducing medical malpractice litigation against healthcare providers starts
with the conduct of the doctors and the safety measures they implement to
ensure the well-being of their patients.

III. Diagnosing the "Crisis" in New York
There are several misconceived notions and allegations made by groups
such as MSSNY pertainn to the cause of the current "crisis" situation
in Ness York. IThe primary cause of this insurance problem is a tailure
by the State to manage pioperly the funds in the insurance pool foi highrisk phiysicians, and a tailure ot the OPMC to monitor and oxversee their
professionals properls. The State also failed to iregulate medical malpiractice
insurance rates properly.134 From 1991-2007, the rates increased at a
stagnant asverage of 3.500 annually. wxith xvirtually no incrcase in insurance
rates until 2003. The asverage rate hike in the U nited States in that same
timne period xxas nearly double at 6.5%.1i35 Thus, wxith prcmiums lowser
than the inational asverage aind declining rev enues, the only vsay for the
insurance companies to rebound was to hike rates dramatically. Ilowever,
the Insurance Department would not grant a 300o raise request in 2007 and
instead raised premiums by 14%. 6
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Nearly 100,000 people die in the United States each year from medical
mistakes, which exceeds the number of individuals who die in automobile
or workplace accidents."! Emphasizing the poor regulation of physicians
by the OPMC, it is important to note that approximately 6,189 doctors made
two or more malpractice claim payouts. Of that group, only 8.5% received
some disciplinary action, and only 11% of the 3,057 doctors that made three
or more payments were disciplined."' Undr the OPMC regulations and
the proposed bills, reports of three separate payments automatically trigger
an immediate investigation by the OPMC as to that physician's conduct.
MSSNY claims that, as a result of the hostile litigation climate of New York
and the recent increase in premium rates, there are shortages in several
medical specialties.139 In contrast, New York's physician pool actually
is flourishing. The physician population has increased by 20.5% from
1995-2007, an increase of 15.8% in the number of physicians per 100,000
residents.140 If physicians are fleeing New York for friendlier environiments
(i.e., states that have less medical malpractice litigation) then why does
New York boast a greater amount of practicing physicians and specialists
per capita and nearly double the residents and fellows on duty than both
Calilornia and Texas, which are considered tort reform states?141
MSSNY, the New York Chapter of the American College of Surgeons,
and New York State Society of Orthopaedic Surgeons contend that, during
"crisis" periods, physicians flee those areas, and most specialties restrict their
scope. As to the first contention, a report by the GovernmentAccountability
Office (GAO), clearly states that physicians did not flee perceived medical
malpractice "crisis" states, contrary to the contentions of the AMA.142
Another study also clearly contradicts the medical societies' contention that
specialists limit the scope of their practices during "crisis."143 Connecticut
has the highest percentage of orthopedic surgeons even though general
surgeons pay thousands of dollars more in premiums than general surgeons
in New York. 144
T-he Orthopaedic Society asserts in its submissions to the Task Force that
there is a scarcity of specialists, as evidenced by certain counties having two
or fewer orthopedic surgeons.145 However, the counties that the Orthopaedic
Society referred to are rural counties and are in regions with the lowest
premiums, thus contradicting its argument. The surgeons are actually
leaving cheaper premium regions to work in New York City or Connecticut
where the premiums are much more expensive.146 This demonstrates that
premiums have little to no effect on where a physician practices. In addition,
there has not been an increase in medical malpractice claims. According
to the Insurance Information Institute, one in eight patients who suffer an
injury fronm an adverse event wvill fIle a malpractice lasssuit and one out of
15 wvill receive compensation. 14 7 IThe amount of malpractice pay outs has
remained steads from 1991 to 2006, xsith a slight decline in the asverage
betsween 2002-06.148IFurther, the number of payments made by phy sicians
has also stcadily declined in recent yecars.149) Furthermore, the number of
Request for Judicial Intersvention in medical malpiractice actions has stay ed
around 4,300 per sear.1 o
Medical Lmalprctice premLiLLLLumol) acco.unLt for twou

percent ofhalhcare

costs., 1L Iasssuits are one of the smallest tactors driv ing up health costs,

Malpractice cases
at less than one percent of total healthcare spending.
could be cut by one-third if the OPMC disciplined doctors who committed
three or more malpractice payments. I'Lastly, limiting medical malpractice

liability will undermine any incentives for safety because there will be one
less check on the conduct of physicians in the treatment of patients. This
will make it more difficult for those patients with legitimate but difficult
claims to find legal representation, especially with reforms driving up
litigation costs.15

IV. Conclusion
There is a crisis in the State of New York, but it has little if anything to do
with litigation of malpractice claims. The crisis is the unsafe environment
that patients in New York deal with when undergoing treatment - whether
it is within a physician's office or in a hospital. As long as unethical doctors
like Dr. Harvey Finkelstein are allowed to continue their practice and
receive subsidized malpractice insurance, patients will be at a great risk of
injury. The unchecked and unmonitored subsidizing of high-risk physicians
guarantees the continuation of inexcusable medical errors. Good doctors
should not be penalized simply because they practice a particular specialty.
Neither they nor their insurer should be forced to subsidize physicians who
are not able to obtain commercial insurance.
Tort reform is not the solution - all it will do is subject the malpractice
victims to further hardships and deprive them of their legal rights to
due process and a trial by jury. Funds like the Neurologically Impaired
Infant Fund forces this remedy upon plaintiffs and encroaches upon
their constitutional right to a jury trial. Caps on non-economic damages
only subject the severely injured plaintiff to the further harm of "doublejeopardy." Ihe caps do not correlate with a reduction in premium rates;
however., they do reduce the claims brought by women, children and the
elderly. If the bill for the subsidized insurance for high-risk physicians is
allowed to pass, then the bill should be named "Harvey's Law," because it
will only benefit doctors like Dr. Harvey Finkelstein, and subject the public
to further harm and injury.
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